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lli THE SUPREME COURr OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHIE ADELL MUNFORD, 
. 
. 
vs. 
RAYMOND G. MUNFORD, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
case Number 18088 
This case is a divorce action carm:mced by Plaintiff in the 
District Court of M:>rgan County. About 6 -weeks following the trial 
and the Courts decision in the case, APPELIA.W filed a lt>tion under 
Sec;tion 30-3-5 utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, seeking a 
reconsideration or m::xli.f ication of the Courts Judgerrent or Decree 
on the property question. 
DISPOSITIOO IN THE u:MER COURT 
After a hearing, with evidence presented and argurrent of counsel, 
the lower Court denied APPELIANT'S lt>tion. 
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RELIEF SOOGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant requests that APPEIJ.J\NT'S appeal be dismissed, and 
that the Judgement and ruling of the ID\\er Court be affinned. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about January 14, 1981, without the knowledge or pennission 
of Defendant, Plaintiff left Defendant and his three children of a 
prior marriage, and took her tv;o children (of a prior marriage, which 
tv;o children had been adopted by Defendant), along with many items of 
personal property and fcxxl storage, etc. (R-12-14; TR-33-34). 
The marriage between the parties had taken place arout 4 years 
prior to this time, and Plaintiff had rroved into the home of Defendant, 
which had been previously aCXIUired by him. 
The Parties had their problems and difficulties in trying to 
reconstitute 2 separate families during the 4 year period, but 
Defendant was unaware of Plaintiff's intentions to leave him (R-14; 
TR-33-34). 
The Parties \\ere having a very difficult time meeting all their 
obligations and expenses by reason of the recession, especially in the 
car business, 'Which Defendant was engaged in, and Defendants rconthly 
incane about that time was less than his monthly outgo {about 
$1,300.00 Gross incare and about $1,600.00 minimt:nn expenses), (R-15-16). 
About December 15, 1980, a month prior to Plaintiff leaving 
Defendant, said Defendant made application to l:x:>rrow $23,000.00 fran 
his credit union in order to help out on the bills and obligations 
and to consolidate sare of their debts. The hane of Defendant was 
encumbered by a 2nd M:>rtgage for the $23,000.00 and the loan was con-
2 
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surrrnated on January 14, 1981. ~fendant personally still ~s and 
is paying on this loan, and Plaintiff has no obligation (TR-79,87). 
Plaintiff filed her Canplaint for Divorce against Defendant on 
January 19, 1981, and anong other things she asked for an equitable 
interest in Defendant's hare (R-1-5). 
At the ti.Ire of the loan application by Defendant y,Tj_th his credit 
union, about December 20, 1980, the credit union conducted an appraisal 
on the Defendant's hare for the plllJX)se of the loan, and Plaintiff 
was well aware of that appraisal and its plllJX)se, and she and her 
attorney had a copy of the sane which was introduced by them at 
the trial as Plaintiff's exhibit "P-H" (R-33,94). Plaintiff and her 
attorney in fact insisted on an additional appraisal done on the 
hare for the trial, as the December 20, 1980 appraisal was done by 
the "Credit Union for a different plllJX)se" (R-30-31). 
From the tine of filing Plaintiff's Corrplaint, January 19, 1981 
until the tirre of trial in ti.11is case, Ma.y 12, 1981, Plaintiff's counsel 
did not serve any interrogatories on, nor take deposition of, 
Defendant in regard to the case, t..11e assets, debts, etc. However, 
counsel for Plaintiff did express sare surprise on the 2nd r-Drtgage 
for $23,000.00 at the tine of trial, whereupon Judge Thornley K. 
Swan states, "It ought not to, its been on, he says, he took it 
out last December" - - - - "We have had all that tine to find out 
about it, Mr. Vlahos" (TR-86). 
It was Defendant's contention that the hare, having been acquired 
by Defendant prior to his ·marriage to Plaintiff should remain the 
property of Defendant, including the equity therein, as very little 
had been paid off on the M:>rtgages during the marriage and Plaintiff 
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had put no rroney into it (R-13; TR-66, 70). The Trial Court, however, 
after weighing all the evidence and hearing the arguments of counsel, 
and in its discretion, awarded $6,000.00 equity to Plaintiff in 
Defendant's hare. 
Plaintiff, by this appeal, is not satisfied with the WY.er Courts 
ruling .,:Jn this particular issue and says the Trial Court has abused. 
it's discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELI.ANT FAILED TO FILE HER APPEAL IN THE 
TIME REQUIRED BY STATUTE, AND THE APPEAL SHOUID 
BE DISMISSED. 
It is not quite clear to counsel for RESPONDENT vtlether APPELIANT 
is appealing the alleged abuse of discretion of the trial Judge, 
Thomley K. Swan, of May 12, 1981, or the alleged. abuse of dis-
cretion of Judge J. Duffy Palmer, in the subsequent hearing on 
September 3, 1981. 
APPELLANT'S POINT I seems to go to the question of Judge Palmer's 
abuse of discretion in denying the nodif ication or reconsideration 
rrotion of September 3, 1981. Yet the cases cited and the argurrent 
by counsel appear to attack the decision of Judge Swan on May 12, 1981, 
wherein, "The loan of $23,000.00 was never taken into consideration, 
either at trial or in subsequent Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, or Decree, by the Court." (That \\Ould be Judge Swan) 
(APPELLANT' S BRIEF, Page 4} . 
In either event, Plaintiff's appeal is not proper or well taken 
and should be dismissed. 
If Plaintiff's appeal is fran Judge Swan's Findings and Decree 
in the Divorce action, which were entered in t~:: ------., 
4 
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1981, although signed by him on July 17, 1981, then Plaintiff has 
failed to file her appeal in the one IOOnth pericrl of tirre pennitted 
by Statute, as this appeal was not filed until September 17, 1981. 
Col.lllsel for APPELLANT argues that his filing a r-t:>tion for 
r.txiif ication or Reconsideration stays the tirre for filing the appeal 
until after that matter is ruled upon. However, counsel in his brief 
admits that his Motion for lvbdification or Reconsideration was under 
Section 30-3-5 utah Code Annotated. (APPELLANT'S BRIEF, Page 4). 
Rule 73(a) Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, provides that 
the running of the tirre for appeal is tenninated only by a timely 
lt>tion made pursuant to Rule 50(b), Rule 52(b) or Rule 59 of' the 
utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 50 (b) involves a Motion for 
Judgement notwithstanding the verdict. Rule 52 (b) involves a 
lt>tion to amend the Findings or to make additional Findings. Rule 
59 involves a Motion for a new trial or making new Findings. 
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration or M:rlification was not 
filed under any of the arove rules, but was filed for the purpose 
of asking the Court to make other Orders in relation.to the property 
distribution, "as may be equitable", under Section 30-3-5 of the Utah 
Code. 
It should be noted that the M:>tion for Reconsideration or lvbdifi-
cation was filed by Plaintiff on July 2, 1981, (R-36) and yet counsel 
for Plaintiff did not even sul:mit the Findings and Decree in the case 
to the trial Judge until July 17, 1981, and they were not filed in 
the Court until July 28, 1981 (R-38-43). Thus, Plaintiff cannot argue 
that h?r ~tion was filed for t~e purpose of amending or making 
5 
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additional Findings. 
It appears, therefore, that Plaintiff's ~ion did not stay the 
time for filing appeal, and inasmuch as rrore than one nonth expired 
fran the entry of the Decree in the Register of Actions, {July 28, 
1981) to the time of filing the appeal {September 17, 1981), this 
appeal should be dismissed. 
In the event Plaintiff's appeal is strictly fran Judge Palmer's Order 
denying Plaintiff's r.btion tmder Section 30-3-5 of the Utah Code, said 
appeal is also not well taken for the following reasons: 
(a) Plaintiffs M:>tion, Paragraphs 4 and 5, (R-36), stated in 
substance that Plaintiff had made further investigation in re-
gard to the $23,000.00 loan and the Court should set a date and 
time for hearing further evidence and testinony that Plaintiff 
would present. Over the objections of Defendant and his counsel 
Judge Pabner on September 3, 1981 did in fact allow Plaintiff to 
put on further evidence, and then after full consideration, the 
Court felt there was no basis for reconsideration of the Trial 
Courts decision. {R-1-3 of the September 3, 1981 hearing). 
(b) Under Section 30-3-5 of the utah Code, it provides: 
- - - "The Court shall have continuing jurisdiction 
to make subsequent changes or new Orders with 
respect to the support and maintenance of the Parties, 
the custody of the children and their support and 
maintenance, or the distribution of the property 
as shall be reasonable and necessary." 
Therefore, Plaintiff has her remedy under this statute if and 
when she can, by proper M:>tion, Affidavits, and evidence, 
show the reasonable and necessary change of circumstances. 
The appeal to the Supreme Court is therefore unnecessary and 
not well taken. 
6 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II 
THE LOVER COOR'!' DID :NOI' ABUSE IT'S DISCRETICN, 
AND IT'S DECISION SHOUID BE AFFIRMED. 
The Trial Court, Judge Thomley Swan, took into oonsideration 
all of the property interests of the Parties, including a full 
consideration of the $23,000.00 2nd lt>rtgage, the payrrent of bills 
and debts, etc. in making his discretionary Judgement and ruling in 
this case. The court also took into consideration the increase 
and appreciation in value of Defendant's hane. Thus, the cases 
cited by counsel for APPELIA.l\fl' in his Brief are either distinguish-
able or not applicable to our situation. 
In the Wooley v. Wooley case, 195 P 2nd 743; 113 utah 391, 
cited in APPELIANT'S Brief, the Parties had lived together nore than 
30 years and part of the funds both parties accumulated \Ent into 
a speculative interest, and thus the Court held the wife was 
entitled to a share of any increase in value of such speculative 
interest. 
In the instant case, the court did take into consideration the 
$23,000.00 loan and Mortgage as ~11 as giving the Plaintiff a fair 
and equitable arrount· fran the increase in value in Defendants hane, 
even though the Parties had lived together only about 4 years. 
Furthenrore, the Suprerre Court should not interfer in a Trial 
Court's discretion in such cases unless there is clear evidence of 
an arbitrary decision fran the record. The t\looley case above cited is 
good authority for the utah Law on this question. The oourt therein 
stated: 
"The Supreme Court will not substitute it's judge-
emnt in divorce proceedings relative to alirrony 
and division of property for that of the Trial 
Court unless the record clearly discloses that 
the Trial Courts Decree in such matters in plainly 
arbitrary." 
7 
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(see also Allen v. Allen 165 P 2nd 872; 109 UT. 99, as one of the 
leading cases on t1ri.s issue. ) 
The Smit.11 v. Smith case, 291 P. 298; 74 UT. 60, and the Glover 
v. Glover case, 242 P 2nd 298; 121 UT. 362, cited in APPELLANTS 
argument are distinguishable from ti11e present case in ti"lat one 
of b,e Parties in t..~ose cases had committed fraud or had failed to 
fully disclose to the court what t.i."Leir true condition was as to 
the property.· · In our case, Defendant fully disclosed to ti11e court 
what the true condition was as to t11e property and the r-hrtgages 
o\<lng, and Plaintiff certainly knew or should have known, and had 
plenty of time to determine all the facts as to t."Le property, debts, 
etc. as was rrentioned by tJ1e Trial Judge (R-86). Consequently, 
there is no evidence of fraud nor evidence in the record to show 
abuse of discretion by ti11e Trial Court. 
Counsel for APPELIANT also cites Fletcher v. Fletcher (1980) 
615 P 2nd 1218, a Utah case, wherein t}ie Trial Courts findings and 
discretion -were in fact affirrred on appeal. The Trial Court !'lad 
considered in that case, as was also done in the present case, the 
equity of tx:Jt~, parties to the action in any interest ti11e parties 
may have acquired in the hare prior to the Divorce ~cree. Judge Swan 
fully considered and awarded Plaintiff an equitable interest in 
Defendants hare based upon it's appreciated value during ti"Le marriage. 
Where is the abuse of discretion? 
The Utah Suprerre Court in ti,e Fletcher case also makes abundant-
ly clear that on appeal t~1e Court wi.11 not disturb the Trial Court's 
decision without clear evidence of abuse. The Court states: 
"on appeal of Divorce Proceedings, The Supre..tre Court · 
will not disturb the action of tJie Trial Court 
unless evidence clearly ~reponderates to the 
contrary, or the Trial Court has abused it's 
discretion, or misapplied principles: -~- -····~ 
8 
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"In division of Marital property in Divorce Pro-
ceedings, the Trial Judge has wide discretion, 
and his findings will not be disturbed lll1less 
~'1e record indicates abuse tJiereof" 
Again, there has been no showing of abuse in the record by either 
Judge Swan or Judge Palrrer in ~us case, and the Trial Court '·s 
decision and rulings should be affinred. 
CONCLUSION 
In as much as APPELLANT'S entire argurrent appears to go to 
~"le abuse of discreti0n of ti"te Trial Judge, Thomley K. S\van, and 
the ~tion for Reconsideration or .M:xli.f ication cares under Section 
30-3-5 of the Utah Ccx:le, Plaintiff's appeal should be dismissed, 
as not having been tirrely filed. In t.l-ie alternative, the Trial 
Judge's findings, Decree, and rulings should be affirrred and ~11eir 
discretion in the property distribution in this case not be 
disturbed. 
sl 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITI'ED this :J/- day of December, 1981. 
CERI'IFICATE OF MAILrnG 
si 
I hereby certify that on the JI- day of December, 1981, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of t..l'le foregoing Brief of Respondent 
to Pete N. Vlahos, Attorney for Appellant, at legal Forum Building, 
2447 Kiesel Avenue, O:lgen, Utah, 84401, i;ostage prepaid. 
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